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"The policy on which the rule is based would be defeated if it were held that whenever an officer uses his office for a personal motive not connected with the public good
he acts outside his power." 24

But the policy on which the rule is based would be furtkered if it were held that
when public officials conspire with outsiders and use their office for a personal
motive not connected with the public good, they are acting beyond the scope of
their authority and are liable. In such a case, the officials concerned are deprived
of the protection of the immunity rule and are liable because they fail to meet a
requisite of the immunity doctrine,namely, that they act within the scope of their
authority.
Our present vast administrative machine, run by countless officials with numerous duties, requires, more than ever before, that the immunity doctrine be strictly
applied. Otherwise, a few unscrupulous officials may take the attitude that, regardless of what torts they might commit, they are assured of protection by the courts
via the immunity doctrine. There is no need for the doctrine's extension every time
a new case presents itself. Hardy v. Vial was one case where the court could have
limited its application by recognizing an act beyond the scope of authority. It is
indeed unfortunate the court failed to do so.
Robert M. Jakob

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MILITARY COURT MARTIAL JURISDICTION OVER
CIVILIAN DEPENDENTS ACCOMPANYING THE ARMED FORCES OVERSEAS IN
TimE OF PEACE

Normally, offenders against the laws of the United States are tried by civilian
tribunal. There are circumstances, however, in which persons are triable by courts
martial, but because of the great difference in form and procedure it is an exercise
of extraordinary jurisdiction.1 Is it possible to bring civilian dependents accompanying the armed forces overseas in time of peace within the ambit of military
court martial jurisdiction? This was the issue presented to the Supreme Court of
the United States in the cases of Reid v. Covert2 and Kinsella v. Krueger,3 which
were combined in opinion because of the similarity of fact and issue. Both cases
commenced in military courts convened in foreign countries under authority of
article 2, section 11 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (1951).4 The provisions of this article subject all persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying
the armed forces outside the continental limits of the United States and certain
territories to prosecution by military authorities in military courts.
Mesdames Clarice Covert and Dorothy Krueger Smith, as wives of members of
the armed forces, had been transported overseas by the United States government
to join their husbands, who were stationed in foreign countries. While there, they
resided in government quarters or within a community of American military personnel and their dependents. While so situated, each of these women killed her
husband and was tried and convicted of homicide by a general court martial.
24 48 Cal.2d at

....

311 P.2d at 497.

1 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 41 (1957).
2 354 U.S. 1.
Ibid.
5

4 So U.S.C.A. §552.
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Thereafter, they were returned to the United States to serve the prison terms imposed by the military courts.
While awaiting a rehearing before the United States Court of Military Appeals, 5 Mrs. Covert petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. She alleged that art. 2, sec. 11, U.C.M.J.
was invalid because it contravened her constitutional right, as a civilian, to a grand
jury indictment and trial by jury.6 The writ was granted 7 to Mrs. Covert and the
government appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
Following Mrs. Smith's return to the United States, she was confined in the
Federal Reformatory for Women, Alderson, West Virginia. At that time, her
father, acting in her behalf, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the
appropriate Federal District Court making substantially the same allegations that
were made in the Covert case. The writ, however, was denied; 8 and, while an appeal was pending, the government sought and was granted a writ of certiorari by
the Supreme Court.
Both cases were decided in favor of the government, 9 but after rehearing, the
Supreme Court reversed itself and ordered the release of the petitioners. The court
declared that civilian dependents accompanying the armed force overseas in time
of peace accused of capital crimes could not be tried by court martial.10
Since the ruling was so narrowly limited, the problem still remains as to
whether or not civilian dependents accused of lesser crimes, or civilians otherwise
connected with the armed forces overseas in time of peace can be tried by court
martial. The answer cannot be found in the opinions delivered by the members of
the Supreme Court since they were equally divided as to the reasoning supporting
the ruling." Four opinions were delivered: One, in which four justices joined, delivered the ruling; one, in which two justices joined, dissenting; and two separate
opinions were delivered, concurring in the ruling, but parallel in reasoning to the
dissent.
In attempting to solve the questions left unanswered by the Supreme Court, it
will be found that the Legislative Department's authority for establishing courts
martial is based on article I, section 8, clause 14 of the United States Constitution which empowers Congress to make rules for the Government and Regulation
of the Land and Naval Forces.
Military courts created under authority of this article are creatures of Congress and are not in any way connected with the federal court system provided for
in article III, section 2 of the Constitution.' 2 The purpose of courts martial is to
implement the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. So that
the fulfillment of this purpose would not be unduly frustrated, military courts are
expressly exempted by the fifth amendment from the requirement of a grand jury
5 The conviction had been set aside on grounds not pertinent here but reaffirmed after
rehearing.
6 U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
7 Reid v. Covert, 24 U.S.L. Week 2238 (DDC Nov. 22, 1955).
8 Kinsella v. Krueger, 137 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.W.Va. 1956).
9 Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 470; Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 487 (1956).
10 354 U.S. 1.

11 Mr. Justice Whittaker took no part in the decision.
12 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39 (1942).
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indictment, 13 and exempted by implication from the jury trial requirements of the
sixth amendment. 14
As creatures of Congress, the jurisdiction of military courts martial is not
strictly limited and may be expanded or contracted, as Congress may provide.
The only limitation would seem to be the scope of the purpose for which they were
created, that is, the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. With
respect to this purpose, the necessary and proper clause of article I, section 8,15
must be considered. This clause provides that Congress shall have the power to
make all laws which are necessary and proper to execute its specifically enumerated powers. The effect of the necessary and proper clause has traditionally been
held to be expansive of the specific powers of Congress.' 6 The logical conclusion
would be that Congress may give military courts jurisdiction not only over military personnel, but also over civilians if it becomes necessary and is proper in the
regulation of the land and naval forces.
This conclusion, however, has completely separated one section of the Constitution from the rest of that document, and therefore has presented a lopsided view
of the problem. To decide the issue on this basis would be incongruous with the
intent and meaning of the Constitution, which is, in its entirety, an organized
scheme of government within which we must operate.' 7 We therefore must consider
the provisions of the Constitution which secure for civilians the right to trial by
jury and grand jury indictment 18 and what effect, if any, they have upon the
congressional power to legislate for the purpose of governing and regulating the
armed forces.
We are concerned here with the rights of civilians outside the continental limits
of the United States, since the provisions of art. 2, sec. 11, U.C.M.J. affect only
civilians in that category. What rights do citizens thus affected have? One of the
basic principles of international law is that a sovereign nation has exclusive jurisdiction over all civilians within its territorial limits.' Therefore, an American
civilian within a foreign country does not have the protection of any right guaranteed to him by the United States Constitution. The foreign country can, however,
relinquish its exclusive jurisdiction by consent. ° This consent has been obtained
by the United States so that art. 2, sec. 11, U.C.M.J. will be operative with respect
to civilian dependents like Mrs. Covert and Mrs. Smith. Thus, if the United States
government can acquire jurisdiction over American civilians in foreign countries,
does the civilian affected automatically reacquire all his constitutional rights? Or
to reverse the question, does the Constitution of the United States limit Congress
when enacting legislation that affects these civilians over which it has acquired
jurisdiction? The Supreme Court answered this question in part in the principal
case when it declared that Congress could not subject civilian dependents to military trial when accused of capital crimes.2 1 This ruling would seem to indicate that
all of the applicable provisions of the Constitution should be considered; but the
13 U.S. Const. amend. V.
14

Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 40.

15 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
16 CoNs
TuioN or Tm Um=

STATES or A
mCA (annotated), art. I, § 8, ci. 18 (Corwin ed. 1952).
17 354 U.S. at 44 (concurring opinion).
18 U.S. Const. art. MI, § 2; U.S. Const. amend. V; U.S. Const. amend. VI.
19 Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923).
20
In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
21354 U.S. 1.
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ruling does not say that the Constitution of the United States automatically applies in its entirety outside the continental limits. The problem is analogous to
cases dealing with territories of the United States. The court has uniformly held
that while the "fundamental" principles of the Constitution extend to the territories not incorporated into the Union, Congress may reserve the right to trial by
jury and grand jury indictment, if granting these rights would unnecessarily
encumber the effective government and regulation of the territory.' In cases dealing with this matter, the reasons given for not extending these rights were that the
sociological and political background of the indigenous peoples made their application impractical. Thus, United States citizens in certain of the territories today
have no right to trial by jury.2 The Supreme Court has never spelled out just what
the "fundamental" rights are that do extend to these territories.
Thus it can be said that when congressional legislation affects citizens outside
the continental limits of the United States all of the applicable provisions of the
Constitution are considered but not strictly applied, because to do so would unnecessarily encumber the accomplishment of the legislative purpose.
Applying this reasoning to the problem of court martial jurisdiction over
civilian dependents, it can be said that when the government and regulation of the
armed forces necessitates such jurisdiction, the rights of the civilian can be subordinated to that need.
The judicial history of court martial jurisdiction clearly shows that civilians
have at times become subject to military courts.24 The prominent cases were concerned with civilians employed by or accompanying the armed forces in time of
war. In determining whether or not courts martial had jurisdiction, it was necessary that the armed forces with which the civilians were connected be "in the
field." However, the concept of "in the field" was not strictly limited to the time
of formally declared war, but in general meant presence in training camps, maneuvering areas and concentration points used in preparation for possible or expected
operations against hostile forces. 25 Also it was recently decided that a military
commission, sitting in a foreign country as an arm of the military government of
occupation four years after actual hostilities
had ceased, had jurisdiction to try a
26
civilian dependent for a capital offense.
Court martial jurisdiction over civilian dependents accompanying the armed
forces overseas in time of peace is not a recent development. Congress has felt since
1916 that it was necessary for the proper government and regulation of the armed
forces deployed abroad. 27 Art. 2, sec. 11, U.C.M.J. is substantially the same as its
22

Balzac v. People of Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) ; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244

(1901); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Mafnas v. Government of Guam, 228
F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1955) ; American Pacific Dairy Products v. Siciliano, 235 F.2d 74 (9th Cir.
1956).
2

Mafnas v. Government of Guam; American Pacific Dairy Products v. Siciliano, supra

note 22.
24 Perlstein v. United States, 151 F.2d 167 (3rd Cir. 1945) ; Hines v. Mikell, 259 F. 28 (4th
Cir. 1919) ; Ex parte Jockin, 257 F. 200 (S.D. Texas 1919) ; Ex parte Falls, 251 F. 415 (D. N.J.
1918) ; Ex parte Gerlock, 247 F. 616 (S.D. N.Y. 1917) ; In re De Bortalo, 50 F. Supp. 929
(S.C. N.Y. 1943).
25 354 U.S. at 71 (concurring opinion).
26 Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952).
27 See Comment, Criminal JurisdictionOver Civilian Components and Accompanying Dependents of the Armed Forces in Foreign Countries, 8 HASTINGs L.J. 75, 81 (1956).
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predecessor,2 8 but neither of these enactments has heretofore been tested in the
civilian courts as applied to civilian dependents.
Historically, the federal courts have agreed with Congress that when it becomes necessary and proper to the government and regulation of the armed
forces, civilians may be amenable to court martial jurisdiction. 29 In reviewing
these cases, the courts inquired into the jurisdiction of the military courts and
decided this point on the basis of whether or not the civilian was within the class
designated by the act of Congress giving the military courts jurisdiction. 30 The
Covert and the Krueger cases add the further requisite that the constitutional
rights of the civilian must be considered. It is the opinion of this writer, however,
that court martial jurisdiction over dependents may still be sustained in noncapital cases when it becomes necessary for the government and regulation of the
armed forces. The Covert and Krueger cases can be justified on the ground that
capital cases constitute an extremely small percentage of all the cases that involve
dependents overseas 3' and that lack of jurisdiction in this small percentage of
cases would not materially affect the morale and efficiency of the armed forces.
Secondly, the civilian who is tried for a capital offense has his life in jeopardy and
therefore what rights he has must be carefully safeguarded. Thus, lack of jurisdiction in capital cases does not substantially encumber the mission of the military,
and therefore is not necessary and proper for the government and regulation of the
armed forces.
Four members of the Supreme Court, who agree with the ruling, were opposed
to the foregoing reasoning. 3 2 In their opinion, the words of the Constitution giving
power to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval
forces must be given a literal interpretation, and in no sense could "land and naval
forces" include civilian dependents. The opinion further states that the necessary
and proper clause cannot be expansive of the specific power of Congress when
dealing with civilians, because civilians have a constitutional right to trial by jury
and grand jury indictment. This interpretation, of course, would automatically extend the Constitution and all its provisions to civilian dependents in foreign countries over which the United States gains consensual jurisdiction.
Mr. Justice Black, the author of the opinion adopting the literal interpretation
of the Constitution, feels that any extension of court martial jurisdiction is a
dangerous encroachment upon the rights of civilians guaranteed by the Constitution. He relies heavily upon Ex parte Milligan,33 Duncan v. Kahanamoku,34 and
Totlz v. Quarles35 for authority that the Supreme Court in the past has resisted
strenuously any such encroachments. All three of these cases, however, may be
distinguished by the fact that they concerned civilians who were tried and convicted by military courts within the territorial or continental limits of the United
States. Also, in these cases the Supreme Court concluded that the military courts
did not have jurisdiction because of the fact that there were civilian courts avail28 36 STAT. 619, 10 U.S.C.
29 Cases cited notes 24, 26

§ 1473 (1916).
supra.

SO Supra note 24.
31
Reid v. Covert, Mr. Justice Black's opinion, n.73.
32 354 U.S. 1. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion in which the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan joined.
33 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
34 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
350 U.S. 11 (1955).
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able, or that there were no practical reasons why they could not be made available.
In the Duncan and Toth cases, the court expressly found that under these circumstances the lack of military jurisdiction would not have an adverse effect on morale
and efficiency of the armed forces. Apparently, these cases stand for the positive
proposition that civilians cannot be subjected to military jurisdiction when there
are civilian courts of the United States available to perform the judicial functions.
This proposition would not impair the authority of the previously noted cases that
have sustained court martial jurisdiction over civilians. 36
Mr. Justice Black, however, feels that all the cases that have sustained court
martial jurisdiction over civilians must be justified under the "War Power." But
the power to wage war must also include the power to make the necessary prepara38
tions for waryT The surest way to avoid war is to prepare for it in time of peace.
The reason for keeping a large military contingent in time of peace is only to be
prepared for the eventuality of war. Thus, providing for the morale and efficiency
of the overseas organization can be termed "preparations." For these reasons, even
under the "War Power," civilians overseas can be brought within the jurisdiction
of military courts in time of peace if it is found that the lack of such jurisdiction
would substantially affect the morale and efficiency of the armed forces. Thus,
whether or not the "War Power" is relied upon in order to justify military jurisdiction, the question still revolves around a weighing of what is necessary and
proper against the rights of American civilians outside the continental limits.
The judicial weighing of these opposing interests was seemingly an untenable
proposition to Mr. Justice Black. But a closer study seems to reveal that he conveys this impression only because he was of the opinion that civilian rights must be
protected in time of peace regardless of the price paid in military efficiency.
Why then would Mr. Justice Black refuse to strike down the reasoning of the
territorial cases previously noted that are authority for the proposition that the
Constitution is not strictly applied outside the continental limits?3 9 He would only
limit these cases to their particular circumstances; but in fact there are several
similarities between these cases and the cases concerning civilian dependents accompanying the armed forces overseas. The similarities are the need for effective
control in order to carry into effect a specifically granted power of Congress and
the practical impossibility of empaneling a civilian jury and thereby providing all
the procedural safeguards we enjoy within the continental limits of the United
States.
To deny civilian citizens of the United States residing in territories their constitutional right to jury trial requires a liberal interpretation of the Constitution.
It also entails a balancing of the necessities of effective government against the
right of the individual civilian outside the continental limits. Mr. Justice Black,
however, would adopt a literal interpretation of the Constitution when the rights
of civilians who are United States citizens in foreign countries are concerned.
The literal interpretation of the constitutional provisions concerning the
powers of Congress is inconsistent with the historical application of those powers.
As was noted above, the normal interpretation of the necessary and proper clause
86 Cases cited notes 24, 26 supra.
87Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 327-328 (1936).
88 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE Co isTrruTN, § 1185 (4th ed. 1873).
89
Supra note 22.
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has been expansive of the specifically granted powers.4 0 The provision shows on its
face that it was intended to allow Congress that discretion which would be necessary to carry into effect the powers which have been entrusted to it. But, Mr.
Justice Black would not allow Congress this discretion because the framers of the
Constitution were opposed to military jurisdiction over civilians. The men who
wrote the Constitution lived in a time entirely different from the present day society we enjoy. They had fought for freedom from a government imposed upon them
without adequate representation, and which imposed the will of a few upon many
by the use of force. Under these circumstances, the framers of the Constitution
were most concerned with ridding themselves of an oppressive rule. They had in
mind the establishment of a permanent form of government and one that would
endure into the indefinite future, but the vast possibilities and infinite circumstances which the future held could never have entered their minds."
Today we are not threatened by military rulers. We have a representative form
of government firmly established. Our national security is now threatened from
without and Congress has deemed it necessary to the preservation of that security
to maintain large military contingents overseas. Congress has further decided to
allow civilian dependents to accompany these forces into foreign territory. Both
the military and Congress feel that court martial jurisdiction over civilian dependents accompanying these forces is essential to the execution of the military
mission. It is hard to deny that this jurisdiction has a substantial effect on the military when two members of the Supreme Court vigorously dissent to the striking
down of any part of art. 2, sec. 11, U.C.M.J., and another two members of the
court are unwilling to say that the military should not have jurisdiction over the
great majority of the civilian dependent cases.
The Supreme Court has suggested no practical alternatives to military jurisdiction over civilian dependents. In fact, the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Clark
presents a convincing argument that there are none which would not adversely
affect the interest of the military.
In conclusion, it is this writer's opinion, that to draw a strict line of demarcation between the needs of the military in time of war and its needs in time of
peace is a dangerous proposition. Technically, we are at peace, but the international tranquility and understanding implied by that term are far from realization.
The nation through its representatives in Congress has dictated that a strong military force is the best way to provide for our security. High morale and efficiency
of the military is essential to the effectiveness with which they can carry out their
mission. The national security should be uppermost to all considerations and legislation enacted to implement the security should not be struck down unless it is
clearly unnecessary for the accomplishment of that purpose. The means necessary
to security of a nation are governed by the dangers which threatened it.42 The
Constitution of the United States can be interpreted to include military jurisdiction over civilians in time of peace when the situation necessitates. Until it is
clearly shown that the lack of jurisdiction over civilian dependents overseas does
not adversely effect the mission of the military, art. 2, sec. 11, U.C.M.J., should
be sustained.
Tevis P. Martin Jr.
40
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Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 284 (1901).

42 2 STORy, CoEnnv
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